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Self-in-a-Vat: On John Searle’s
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John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to
rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether
physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of
“gaps” that are supposed to endow the self with free will. Reviewing key steps in
Searle’s argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be suc-
cessfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that rea-
sons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology but a first-person plural, We-
ontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility.
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John Searle always raises fundamental issues for philosophers and
sociologists.1 He has raised questions about language (how can mean-
ing be passed on by mere sound waves; Searle 1969), about the mind
(how the mind can be connected to the physical structure of the brain;
Searle 1992), and about society (how institutions can be part of an
objective world; Searle 1995). In Rationality in Action, Searle (2001b)
now wonders how individuals can escape from the causal determin-
ism of natural forces to freely act upon reasons. He attempts to clarify
and refocus the debate by using a conceptual apparatus cutting across
the interdisciplinary boundaries separating the philosophies of mind,
language, and society (Clément & Kaufmann, 1996). According to
Searle, the common building blocks of the human sciences are
intentionality, that is, the property for a mental state to be about some-
thing, and speech acts. These are the only phenomena whose ontol-
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ogy fits the latest discoveries of the exact sciences, that is, the theory of
biological evolution of species and the theory of physical particles of
matter. However, as Searle shows it, this common naturalist ontology
runs into numerous difficulties. By relying on the impersonal, third
person viewpoint peculiar to the science, it makes so-called first per-
son phenomena, such as consciousness, free will, rational decision
making, and reasons for acting, extremely difficult to account for.
How indeed can an externalist, objectivist approach describe what
seems to be submitted to a subjective ontology, that is, a mind-
dependent ontology? The starting point of Searle’s inquiry is this
apparent incompatibility between the mental superstructure of the
mind, which would be the homeland of free will and subjective deci-
sion making on one hand, and the material infrastructure of the brain,
which is causally determined, on the other. The main question con-
cerning free will is indeed “How can it be the case that we perform
free actions, given that every event has a cause and causal determina-
tion make free actions impossible?” (Searle 2001b, 4).
Actually, for Searle, deterministic physical mechanisms do not
endanger the freedom of the will because reasons for acting are not
unconscious causes, neurobiologically implemented in the brain.
Against what he calls the “Classical Model of Rationality,” he claims
that ends, motivations, beliefs, and desires do not function as both
causes and reasons for acting.2 If it were the case, the agent could not
do otherwise than acting upon his prior set of beliefs and desires, and
the sense of freedom in voluntary action would be a mere illusion. In
Searle’s framework, reasons for acting are far from being a fixed set of
preferences that would function as sufficient conditions for an action
to occur. On the contrary, reasons are nothing but conflicting and
incompatible ends that require evaluation and deliberation on the
agent’s part (Searle 2001b, 30-31). Thanks to the double “gap” that
separates reasons for acting and the final action—that is, a gap
between reasons and decision making and a gap between the decision
and its carrying out—ends, beliefs, and desires are causally ineffi-
cient. This claim has two important implications for Searle’s
approach. First, in virtue of those gaps, the agent’s power to knowl-
edgeably choose his actions is safeguarded: rational agency and free
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2. According to Searle, the original sin of such a model consists in reducing rational
decision making to the selection of means necessary for achieving one’s desired ends.
In accordance with Kant’s famous claim, that is, “he who wills the ends wills the
means,” the so-called Classical Model of Rationality wrongly sees deliberation as being
always about means, never about ends (Searle 2001b, 4).
will depend on the existence of an irreducible, conscious self, which
has the capacity to make a reason effective by acting on it. Second,
practical reason is different from theoretical reason, so emphasized in
the so-called “Classical Model of Rationality,” which would provide
the agent with the rules of logical inferences enabling him to select the
means necessary for achieving his desired ends. For Searle, “rational-
ity in action” consists indeed in finding some way to adjudicate
between various inconsistent aims and to give up some desires in
order to satisfy others.
In this article, I will leave aside Searle’s theory of rationality to dis-
cuss only two aspects of his philosophy, both concerned with ontolog-
ical issues. In the first part of my argument, I will discuss the issue of
causal determinism and Searle’s solution to the opposition between
the “indeterminate” level of the mind, submitted to the free will of
agents, and the “determinate” level of the brute, blind forces of the
unconscious bits of matters that make up the brain. I will argue that
this alleged solution is indeed very problematic because it mainly
relies on what could be called “the multifaceted causation” of “bio-
logical naturalism” (part I). In the second part of my argument, I will
focus on the ontology that underlies Searle’s conception of reasons for
action, with special emphasis on his distinction between two “species
of reasons”: the traditional motivational set of desires and needs,
shared by other evolved primates, which refers to things agents want
to do, and the second species of reasons, specifically human, which
refers to things agents have to do, whether they want to or not (part II).
I will argue that the concept of desire-independent reasons, although
insightful and promising, does not come up to the expectations it
might raise, mainly because of its solipsist, individualistic premises.
After an ontological reconstruction of those individualistic grounds, I
will propose an alternative approach to reasons for action, more
compatible, in my sense, with their social and institutional dimension
(III).
I. BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM
According to Searle, agency logically requires a conscious entity,
namely, the self, which has the capacity to initiate and carry out
actions. But it has still to be shown, Searle says, that the self, free will,
and the gap between reasons and action are genuine ontological phe-
nomena and not illusions: the supposed agentive behavior might
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indeed be entirely preprogrammed with the physical deterministic
mechanisms ruling the brain. In this case, conscious decision, free
will, and the self would have no causal power as such and would
therefore be epiphenomenal. Although agents feel they have power and
freedom when they act, their actions would be determined by uncon-
scious causes (Searle 2001b, 280-81). To avoid this deterministic con-
clusion, naturalist philosophy has to find a way to account for free
will without infringing the requirements of the materialist, realist
ontology of the physical sciences. That is precisely the challenge
Searle tries to take up, hence his commitment to monist ontology (Ia),
to the efficient causation that is supposed to underlie it (Ib) and to
methodological solipsism (Ic).
Ia. A Monist Ontology?
Against a tradition that wrongly divides the world into two forms
of reality, the mental and the physical, Searle maintains that we live in
a single world. Nevertheless, in this unique world, there are two
kinds of phenomena, the physical, which exist independently of us,
and the mental, which exist only relative to our intentionality (Searle
1998, 2000). To prevent a dualistic ontology, split up into physical and
mental phenomena, brain mechanisms and the contents of conscious-
ness have to be related by a bottom-up causality (Searle 2000, 566).
This causal reductionism is indeed essential for a unitary naturalist
ontology because it permits at any time the reduction of high-level
mental states to the low-level neurophysiological goings-on in the
brain. Such a reductionism ensures the material identity between the
empirical referents of neurological and mental states and hence their
strict correspondence in the world independently of any observer’s
perspective (Colin 1997, 230-32). In the same way that the extension of
the concept of water can be empirically replaced by its molecular for-
mula H2O, the extension of mental states, whether conscious or not,
are replaceable by their underlying neurological substrate at each
stage of their development. Against any version of the dualism of
properties, which holds that physical implies nonmental, Searle’s bio-
logical naturalism claims that mental and physical properties are not
mutually exclusive: some physical properties are at some level of
description mental whereas all mental properties at another level of
description are physical (Corcoran 2001b, 311).
In Searle’s framework, however, this causal reductionism is in no
way a kind of ontological reductionism (Searle 1991, 182; Searle 1992).
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While insistently defending a single natural ontology, Searle endows
consciousness with a specific “subjective ontology.” This is quite sur-
prising coming, as it does, from someone seeking to refute any
dualistic ontology as a throwback to a traditional, obsolete metaphys-
ics (Searle 1998, 42). From the viewpoint of Searle’s subjective ontol-
ogy, the private, hidden, internal, and subjective mind is indeed
opposed to the public, observable, external, and objective brain. As
Olafson (1994) put it, this theory entails a kind of “brain dualism” that
isolates a subjective brain from an objective one.3 Although mental
states are caused by brain processes and are nothing more than bio-
logical entities, they are ontologically irreducible and accessible only
to the inner consciousness. Searle’s oscillation between, on one hand,
a monist ontology, which is merely provisional, assumed rather than
defended, and, on the other hand, the distinctive existence of the men-
tal, thus makes micro-macro causation a crucial point. Micro-macro
causation indeed is the only remaining ontological link able to pre-
vent mental phenomena from an autonomization that would defi-
nitely be synonymous with a parallel, immaterial world. In other
words, causation has a central role in Searle’s cosmology, in that it is
designed to come to the rescue of a monism jeopardized by the poten-
tial incompatibility between the mental and physical accounts of the
reality. To the extent that micro-macro causation is the last connection
that Searle has at his disposal to fill in the dangerous gaps menacing
his alleged unified ontology, we need to sketch out the main ways he
uses it.
Ib. An Erratic Efficient Causation
Searle claims that the attempt to distinguish between different
kinds of causation is wrong and superfluous: there is only one kind of
causation, and that is efficient causation (Searle 1983, 135; Searle
2001b, 29). As everyone knows, the paradigm of efficient causation is
that of billiard balls: a billiard ball provokes the movement and hence
the trajectory of another one by bumping into it. The causal link con-
necting the antecedent and consequent events is physical and implies
Kaufmann / SELF-IN-A-VAT 451
3. Despite his rhetorical precautions and reiterated rejection of all kinds of dualism,
Searle takes up the dualism between subjective and objective, first-person and third-
person phenomena. His approach implies de facto a bifurcation of biological properties
of the brain, some properties being accessible to any surgeon whereas the remainder is
accessible only to consciousness. As Corcoran (2001, 314) put it, Searle’s biological-
property dualism has thus “all the advantages of theft over honest toil.”
the existence of two a priori separated entities, in this case two billiard
balls. Strangely, for Searle (2001b 41), intentional causation, which
refers to the cases in which a state of affairs causes a mental state (i.e.,
the frog on the water lily creates my visual experience) or a mental
state causes a state of affairs (i.e., the intention to eat frogs causes the
fact that I eat frogs), is a subcategory of efficient causation. Even if the
efficient causation in question does often switch from the “push-pull”
paradigm to the “making something else happen” one, the basic
pattern remains the same (Searle 1998, 59).
In my own discussion below, I would like to show that the generic
status of efficient causation, duly in charge of the unification of an
ontology that risks collapsing at any time, is obviously refuted by the
three mysterious shapes that this so-called efficient causation takes in
Searle’s work. In my sense, the three kinds of causation I am going to
briefly pull apart are too mismatched to play the role of ontological
glue they were supposed to.
Ib.1. Conscious mental states, which are supposedly “caused by the
operations of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain”
(Searle 1983, 265), resort to what could be called Searle’s first kind of
causation. The emergence of conscious macrophenomena, and then
of their higher order properties, is the direct effect of the activation of
neuronal microphenomena, just like the liquidity of water emerges
from the formation of H2O molecules. To the extent that conscious-
ness and intentional states are nothing but high-level states of the
cerebral system, their reality is not distinct from the low-level reality
of neurons they are made of. For Searle (1991, 181-85), the causal effect
of neuronal micro-states, often called “supervenience,” consists in
generating mental macro-properties that are, in turn, causal—pro-
vided that they escape in one way or another from the physical deter-
ministic mechanisms ruling the brain. The problem, according to me,
is that the brain-mind causation in question here, if any, is obviously
not the external relationship between two distinct and independent
entities peculiar to efficient causation. It is rather an internal connec-
tion between two codependent phenomena, namely, mind and brain,
which turn out to be different levels of the same whole structure. This
codependence is then ontological and not causal: as Esfeld (1998, 367)
pointed out, generic ontological dependence among the parts of a
holistic system means that there can be no occurrence of a certain type
unless there is some occurrence of another specific type. But when the
effect (the mind) is so dependent on the cause (the brain), it is not
452 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / December 2005
about efficient causation anymore; both are parts of a unique whole
system whose different levels are determined from “below,” that is,
from the neurological circuits of the brain. Moreover, if consciousness
is the top level of a whole system, deterministic on every level, then
conscious decisions are devoid of any “top-down” causal power. The
analogy between mental properties and other supervenient proper-
ties such as liquidity or solidity is therefore misleading: whereas
liquidity or solidity can be defined by their specific causal powers,
conscious phenomena are defined by their subjective, experiential
quality (Nida-Rümelin, 2002). The causal impotence of the first-
person features of conscious mental states thus puts free will in
jeopardy.
Ib.2. Partly aware of this tremendous difficulty, Searle introduces,
in Rationality in Action, what could be called his second kind of causa-
tion in order to save psychological indeterminism required by free
will from material determinism. Like Penrose (1994), he points to the
nondeterministic physical processes that supposedly prevent the
neurobiological underpinnings of psychology from being causally
sufficient. Those processes, ruled by the indeterminacy of quanta
mechanics, leave a gap between what is happening now in the con-
scious volitional component of the whole-brain system and what is
going to happen next (Searle 2001b, 287-88). The state of the brain-
mind system at a given time is not causally sufficient to determine the
next state of the system. In other words, for Searle, the lack of causally
sufficient conditions at the psychological level goes all the way down
to the lowest level of causal determination. It does not stop at the level
of neurons but continues its descent until the quantum mechanical
level. In virtue of the “underdeterminacy” of psychological states by
their physical substrate, consciousness in general and decision mak-
ing in particular could causally affect each neuron of the system they
are part of. And free will would have an important place in the
system.
Unfortunately, this kind of quantum causation, just like the bot-
tom-up link mentioned above, turns out to be an internal connection
that does not deserve as such the label of efficient causation. More-
over, in my view, such a causation is surprisingly selective. How
indeed can one explain that all high-level properties of the mental
(e.g., subjectivity, qualitativeness, and unity) are distinguishable
from low-level properties, except for the property of indeterminacy,
which would be miraculously preserved cross level? A causal link is
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supposed to be systematic; it cannot transfer only one unchanged
neuronal property, namely, indeterminacy, to the upper level of the
mind while drastically transforming the remaining brain properties
into subjective features. Moreover, even if such a selective causation
were conceivable and mental phenomena were effectively indetermi-
nate, it would not necessarily endow conscious decision making with
the final determination of the action. On one hand, this argument
commits a genetic fallacy; it is not because the elementary building
blocks at the origin of mental phenomena are indeterminate in nature
that these mental phenomena are themselves indeterminate. After all,
billiard balls are also grounded on indeterministic quanta mecha-
nisms, and this fact does not prevent their shapes, properties, and tra-
jectories from being perfectly determinate and predictable. On the
other hand, the indeterminacy of mental phenomena, if any, does not
necessarily need to be offset by the decisive intervention of the self.
Logically, the final determination of the action could be carried out by
other mechanisms as well, for instance, the nonintentional workings
of abilities, dispositions, and skills or the behavioral triggers
provided by the external world (Ryle 1949/1984).
Ib.3. Apart from the (too) intimate relationships between cause and
effect that characterize the brain-mind causation, Searle implicitly
assumes another kind of so-called efficient causation. What could be
called his third kind of causation leaves the cross-level of micro-
macro relations and takes place in the upper level of mental states. It
indeed relates reasons for acting (desires, motivations), intentions or
decisions, and the effective action “modulo the gap” that separates each
of them (Searle 2001b). Thanks to this gap, the causal link between the
reasons for acting and the effect that the action itself constitutes is nec-
essary but not sufficient. The “self,” which has by definition a full
range of alternatives available to it, adds the subjective, free, and deci-
sive surplus sufficient to bring about the action. Even if Searle (2001b,
17) understandably rejects this way of putting it by claiming that
“nothing fills the gap, you just make up your mind to do something,”
the final causal power, denied to any other stages of decision making,
is de facto bestowed upon the mysterious figure of the self. The self is
duly in charge of the final selection of the reason for acting. Although
the self is a mere “formal requirement on rational action” and a mere
logical property of the “single unified conscious field” (Searle 2001b,
93-95), it thus enjoys a causal power.
454 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / December 2005
This bizarre conclusion does not seem unique in the work of Searle,
who openly claims that intentional states and constitutive rules
“function causally in virtue of their logical structure” (Searle, 2001a,
278). Such confusion between the logical level of what must theoreti-
cally be the case and the ontological level of what causally occurs is
more than embarrassing. Although the logical inquiry is an oblique
way to reach the ontology, it belongs to a formal mode of description
of the reality, not to the reality itself (Récanati 1984). For instance,
human behaviors can be described in terms of rules without being
effectively governed by these rules. The assertion that the analytical
structure aiming at describing the world is causal as such amounts to
the claim that “the roads must be red because they correspond to red
lines on a map” (Ziff 1960, 38). By giving a causal power to logical
structures, Searle mistakes the model of the reality for the reality of
the model. Now, as will be seen, his model of the self does not need
this supplementary difficulty: it is already litigious enough.
Ic. A Solipsist Stance
At the end of this quick review, it appears that the disparate ver-
sions of the alleged efficient causation Searle claims to use are any-
thing but efficient.4 Whether it be the “supervening” bottom-up cau-
sation and the indeterministic quanta causation that characterize the
micro-macro relations or the causal power of the logical entity of the
self that characterizes the intentional level, none of them really
matches either the “push-pull” paradigm or the “making things hap-
pen” model. Those eclectic subspecies of efficient causation do not
indeed seem to be able to perform the function they were entrusted
with, namely, bridging the potential gaps that separate the different
levels of complexity of living matter. In other words, those allegedly
efficient causal links are too mismatched and ad hoc to cement
together the different layers of Searle’s ontology: the absence of genu-
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4. In fact, one could still find a fourth mysterious subspecies of causation in Searle’s
work. This causation concerns what he calls the “pre-intentional background” of
expectations, procedures, and capacities, due to both human biological equipment
(e.g., vision, audition, speech) and local cultural customs (e.g., to pay with money, to
take the bus, to eat frogs; Searle 1983, 1995). The background causal role consists merely
of a weak and not decisive causation because “it enables without determining inten-
tional contents” (Searle 1983, 158). But we will get back later to the issue of the back-
ground and its rather puzzling kind of efficient causation.
ine causal workings makes the monism of his “biological naturalism”
appear more a matter of wishful thinking than a matter of fact.
Once Searle’s pseudo-solution to the mind-body problem is shown
to be empty, we have to see whether or not he does better in the second
part of his undertaking. This latter is concerned, so to speak, with the
upper ontological layer of his model, namely, the ontology of reasons.
In my sense, Searle’s ontology of reasons is also marked by a strong
dualism but a dualism that is no longer bottom-up, such as the brain-
mind connections. This dualism is inner-outer because it radically
separates internal minds from the external world. Actually, the psy-
chological world in which Searle’s sovereign self reigns is almost
impervious to the outer world, including others’ minds. To me, this
odd imperviousness is the consequence of Searle’s “methodological
solipsism,” that is, as Putnam (1975, 220) put it, “the assumption that
no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence
of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is
ascribed.” According to this radical individualist perspective, the
brain has a narrow mental life and can function according to an inter-
nal causal circuit, as the thought experiment of the “brain in a vat”
shows. For Searle (1983, 187), an isolated brain in a vat, fed only on
information transmitted by some crazy scientists, could develop a
perfectly high-functioning mental world. In this virtual brain, just
like in normal brains, intentional states can be defined and explained
independently of any reference to their physical or sociolinguistic
environment. So, “I could have all the intentionality I do have even if I
am radically mistaken, even if the apparent presence and cooperation
of other people is an illusion, even if I am suffering a total hallucina-
tion, even if I am a brain in a vat” (Searle 1990, 407). In other words, no
contribution of the outside world is needed for the determination of
intentional states and, a fortiori, of behaviors. The inner world, funda-
mentally self-sufficient, relies only on the internal states of the brain.
For Searle, we could therefore all be “brains in a vat.” After the inputs
related to the person’s insertion in the external world have been either
deduced from her psychological states or translated into representa-
tional contents, the only things that really matter happen in her head.
Admittedly, the solipsist dogma does not mean the ontological disap-
pearance of the external world. It just aims at simplifying the method-
ology by doing as if agents were structurally alone in the world. But
like any method, methodological solipsism has wide, and not neces-
sarily valuable, heuristic consequences. That is what Searle’s ontol-
ogy of reasons shows, as I will try to demonstrate by reconstructing,
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step by step, his reasoning. To do so, I will start with comments on the
general status of reasons for acting (IIa) before analyzing more
precisely the concept, potentially crucial for the social sciences, of
desire-independent reasons (IIb).
II. THE ONTOLOGY OF REASONS
IIa. A World of One’s Own?
If we are to believe Searle, the reason for any given behavior is the
reason that is subjectively intended by the agent. “Why is it a reason
for me? Because I have freely created it as a reason for me” (Searle
2001b, 189). Paradoxically, this reason can be immoral (e.g., to exploit
others for one’s own profit) or irrational (e.g., to persist in smoking
while knowing that this can provoke cancer some years later), but its
status of reason depends only on the self’s “recognition.” Actually,
only the agent’s “recognitional rationality,” that is, the representation
of reasons by some internal intentional states, is able to elect some
motivators as providing a valid reason for acting.
Although sensible at first sight—after all, reasons have to be recog-
nized by the agent to become effective—this claim turns out to be very
problematic. In fact, what deserves or not the label of reason is not a
mere matter of philosophical vocabulary. Endowing, like Searle’s
model, any irrational, immoral, or absurd motives with the status of
reasons for acting dismisses a constitutive property of reasons,
namely, the ability to justify what happened. As Winch (1958, 81) put
it, a husband who says he killed his wife out of jealousy explains his
behavior but he does not justify it because such a motive does not meet
the “standards of reasonable behavior current in society.” Admit-
tedly, if one replaces the misleading concept of reasons in Searle’s the-
ory with the notion of motives, one could argue, with Searle, that pub-
lic and acceptable reasons have nothing to do with effective motives.
Good, justifiable reasons would have no role to play in the explana-
tion of action because their use would be limited to the superficial,
polite, and conventional way to deal with one another in the public
domain. For instance, a well-mannered individual will invoke a pre-
text, say a cold, to decline an invitation to dinner although the real rea-
son of his refusal is in fact the bad company of his hosts (von Wright
1983). In this case, the motivating, effective reason is different from
the good, justifying reason.
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This being so, the distinction between good and effective reasons
must not be overestimated. If hypertrophied, it risks relegating all
good reasons for acting to the shallow range of excuses or pretexts.
That is precisely what Searle tends to do: to him, good reasons indi-
cate only why an action should have been done and not the effective
motives stating why it was in fact done (Searle 2001b, 110). Yet it is not
certain that the motivational and normative components of reasons
for acting are as strictly separated from one another as this dualistic
conception suggests. Actually, such a separation tends to draw an
impervious boundary between what is “reasonable” to do for a mem-
ber of a given community and what is “rational” to do for a subject rel-
ative to his practical selection of ends and means. This hermetic
boundary is mainly due to Searle’s definition of rationality as a qual-
ity of the reasoning process, namely, the inner coordination of one’s
own beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, perceptions, and other intentional
states (Searle 2001b, 23). Now, this subjective, mentalist conception of
rationality comes up against an essential requirement for rational
behavior: the evaluation of what would be objectively reasonable for
anyone to perform. Aperson who has ordered a beer in a bar can tech-
nically refuse to pay for it, but this refusal, unlike Searle’s account of
it, manifests less the inalienable exercise of her free will than the irra-
tionality of a decision literally inconsequential. This refusal is indeed
completely irrational from the angle of its logical, unpleasant conse-
quences, such as the insults of the waiter, the public disapprobation of
other customers, or the troubles with the police.
To be genuinely rational, a practical agent cannot thus content him-
self with coordinating his ends as a function of his desires and beliefs
in the inner space of his head. He has to anticipate and evaluate what
could and should be objectively reasonable, justifiable, and appropri-
ate to do given the circumstances, the foreseeable reactions of others,
and his own capacities. As MacIntyre (1986) points out, a person who
greedily devours the unique exemplar of a fruit designed to reduce
the hunger in the world and gives her own appetite as the reason for
her action would appear irrational, asocial, and immoral. In other
words, the glutton’s idiosyncratic motive for eating the precious fruit
does not deserve the public status of a genuine reason for acting.
And yet that is precisely the incongruous conclusion that Searle’s
attempt to ground reasons for acting in the subjective attitudes of soli-
tary individuals leads to. By giving absolute priority to the subjectively
intended reasons, his model dismantles the impersonal reasons
endowing actions with an objective meaning. As a result, one can call
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someone all sorts of names or sexually harass a woman while claiming
that the reasons of one’s action have nothing to do with insulting or
assaulting. Similarly, in Searle’s model, the fact that a woman is in
trouble is not an objective reason to help her because it is up to the agent
to subjectively consider this fact as compelling or not. By making the
determination of action totally independent of its likely interpretation
by the community of reasonable beings, Searle’s solipsist view circum-
vents the objective, impersonal, and public reasons that are embodied
in the actions in question. Such a conception endangers the common-
ality of reasons and opens up an “impracticable” social world, one
that is no longer stable, shared, and shareable in common with others.
In my sense, to avoid this unlikely world, one has to give up con-
ceiving reasons for acting as mental objects, determined in the mind
before any “acting out.” In contrast to Searle’s alleged gap between
reasons for acting and the action itself, fulfilled with the idiosyncratic
and empirical work of conciliation conducted by the self, I think that
reasons are mostly internally linked to actions. Actually, as Mills
(1940) put it, every meaningful action is learnt and associated with a
public “vocabulary of motives” from which private purposes must
derive to count as valid reasons for acting. Reasons-giving is a capac-
ity of standing under a general principle that one’s actions are justi-
fied (i.e., rationally valid) only if they could meet with the agreement
of others (Baynes 2001). This capacity being “as little in my mind as
the movements are in my body” (Ricoeur 1977, 93), reasons are not,
contrary to Searle’s claim, “factitive entities” whose propositional
structure would entail a “that-clause” allowing the self to adopt a rel-
atively distal attitude with regard to them. That is only under the aus-
pices of theoretical rationality that reasons for acting might appear as
mental sentences, intrinsically propositional, summoned before the
tribunal of the consciousness. As for practical reasons, they are not
something that individuals have in their possession. Practical reasons
are constitutive of the common, objective, public intelligibility of
actions and thereby enjoy a pragmatic status. Whatever one’s per-
sonal motives may be, to raise one’s arm in an official assembly aims
to ask for permission to speak, to call someone a rotten bastard means
an insult, and to order a beer is a commitment to pay for it. In those
cases, one cannot claim “I didn’t mean it” when asked for the reasons
for one’s action. Unless the agent is a cultural dope or an ontological
solipsist confined in his own world, he is capable of endorsing the
range of reasons, entitlements, and commitments recognized as
appropriate by his community. But to make this case further, we need
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to dwell on an essential element of Searle’s argument, namely, the
status of desire-independent reasons.
IIb. Desire-Independent Reasons
According to Searle (2001b), what he calls the Classical Model of
Rationality wrongly makes desires the primitive and unique drive to
act. In so doing, such a model forgets that desires are not the generic
matrixes of any reason for acting. Actually, Searle says, human beings
are characterized by the ability to create, recognize, and act on “desire-
independent reasons” for action, such as obligations, commitments,
responsibilities, or requirements. For instance, if I promise to come to
your party, I have the obligation, and so the desire-independent rea-
son, to come to your party. For Searle, commitments and obligations
have a binding force because rational beings tend to recognize com-
mitments and obligations as decisive reasons for acting. This being so,
this “recognitional rationality” does not endanger free will. Agents
are not necessitated but motivated by their commitments and obliga-
tions, mainly thanks to the irreducible “gap” between the recognition
of those commitments and obligations as valid reasons for acting and
the final making of the action.
In my sense, Searle’s “desire-independent reason” is a handy,
insightful concept, which promises to bridge the eternal gap that sep-
arates, in philosophy as well in the social sciences, intentional states
and institutional facts, the mental universe and the social world.
However, as I will try to show, the individualist bias of Searle’s
approach tremendously weakens the heuristic potential of such a
concept. To highlight the logical mistakes at the origin of this failure, I
will split up, for clarity’s sake, Searle’s reasoning on desire-independ-
ent reasons into four different episodes. In the first episode, the agent
binds freely his will; by ordering a beer, he creates the obligation to
pay for it (IIb.1). In the second episode, the agent’s obligation becomes
an is and hence an “epistemically objective fact in the world”; the obli-
gation he creates to pay for his beer is so to speak out there (IIb.2). In the
third episode, the subjective recognition, by the agent, of that is as
being a valid reason for action turns it into an ought; he knows he has
to pay for this beer, whether he wants to or not (IIb.3). In the fourth
episode, however, the agent still has the choice to decide to effectively
act upon this ought; in virtue of his free will, he can refuse to pay for his
beer. The supposedly genuine desire-independent episode, that is the
second one, is thus surrounded by three episodes driven by free will
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and monitored by the self. We have already dealt with the fourth epi-
sode. Even though the agent can technically refuse to pay for his beer,
such a decision is less the expression of a genuine freedom than the
mark of an error of judgment by a “judgmental dope.” So let us
analyze the underlying assumptions of the three remaining episodes.
IIb.1. First Episode: The Self-Creation of Norms
Oddly enough, in Searle’s model, obligations and commitments
are similar to desires and intentions: they supposedly respond to the
same direction of fit, namely, an “upward,” world-to-mind direction
of fit. Just as a given intention (i.e., the intention to eat a cake) can be
satisfied only by the effective realization of the intended state of
affairs (i.e., actually eating a cake), a given commitment (i.e., the com-
mitment to go to Chicago) would be satisfied only if the world really
is the way the agent says it is or will be (i.e., I actually go to Chicago).
This rather counterintuitive direction of fit of obligations and com-
mitments is due to the fact that, in Searle’s view, obligations and com-
mitments are the logical consequences of the willing self-involvement
on the part of the agent, who decides to commit himself and to bind
thereby his will in the future. The decision of committing and obligat-
ing oneself is the prior ground of subsequent, and sometimes unde-
sired, consequences. For Searle, although the self is supposed to face
those undesired consequences, it can always choose to act upon one’s
inclinations instead of meeting one’s commitments.
From my point of view, the problem is that this conception does not
take seriously the meaning of “desire-independent reasons.” By defini-
tion, a phenomenon that is genuinely independent of a person’s
desire cannot depend on this very person’s decision to allow it to
occur or to prevent it from happening. Obligations and commitments
can be all the less agent dependent as they involve other individuals
who typically will benefit from having the obligations and commit-
ments fulfilled (Jackendoff, 1999; Jacques, 2001). The self-constitution
of the agent as a logical subject of obligation that seems to underlie the
expressions such as “I commit, I promise, or I have to pay for my beer”
is a superficial, misleading grammatical feature, leading to the oxy-
moron of a “private obligation.”5 Obligations and commitments com-
prise in their conditions of satisfaction the actual or virtual presence
of beneficiaries counting on their realization, just like any speech act
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5. Of course, this point relates back to the well-known argument of “private lan-
guage” (Wittgenstein 1953/1981; Bouveresse 1976). According to Wittgenstein, the
comprises in its conditions of satisfaction the recognition of its validity
by its addressees.6
This “others-oriented” dimension of desire-independent reasons
does not apparently cross Searle’s mind, which sweeps away decades
of social psychology, sociology, and for once commonsense, by claim-
ing, “Why should I, as a conscious self, care in the least about what
other people think I am bound or obligated to do?” (Searle 2001b,
178). Admittedly, we could imagine the unlikely. Phenomenologically,
some self-centered individuals could remain totally indifferent to
other people’s opinion. In accordance with Searle’s methodological
solipsism, those egocentric persons would be focused only on the
phenomenological, experiential counterpart of their obligations and
commitments. But phenomenological and logical matters must not be
mixed up. Logically, methodological solipsism cannot account for the
constitutive relational dimension of obligations and commitments.
Obligations and commitments indeed cannot be cut off from the out-
side world without losing what they structurally are: either a dyadic
relationship involving “the second person” of the beneficiary (I made
the commitment to go to your party) or a triadic relationship involving
both another person (the waiter) and an institutional economical rule
(if I order a beer, then I have to pay for it; Descombes, 1996). In fact,
those structural relationships, the complementary roles they govern
(the roles of customer and waiter), and the rights and obligations they
imply (the right of drinking the beer entails the duty to pay for it)
explain accurately why commitments and obligations do not have the
same direction of fit as intentions and desires. Actually, well beyond
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meaning cannot be private because an individual could not verify by himself the
“sameness” of the terms he would use to refer to his own sensations. Actually, the idio-
syncratic convention he would establish with himself would have no criteria of verifi-
cation apart from his own memory, necessarily prone to retrospective illusions. Only
the existence of public, objective criteria in force in a given community is able to check
the good usage of a rule and the correct, relevant application of a meaning. This argu-
ment, quite convincing for the language of sensations, is still more convincing as
regards obligations and commitments, which involve by definition other people.
6. Actually, unless one oddly claims, with Searle (1991), that others’ understanding
is not an expected effect of one’s own utterance or that one can perfectly speak without
caring about the reaction of one’s interlocutor, any speech act appears to be, by defini-
tion, perlocutionary. A speech act aims at having a certain effect on the interlocutor,
namely, an effect of recognition. For an interesting discussion of Searle’s theory of
speech acts, see Habermas (1992/1994). That is also the point that Smith (2003) empha-
sizes by recalling the additional deontic condition that Reinach adds on the perfor-
mance of the social act of promising: promises must not be only heard but also accepted
by the one to whom it is addressed.
the intersubjective, contractual component of mutual agreements and
promises, commitments and obligations are embedded in a holistic
web of structural dependences that imposes upon agents the way
they are supposed to act.
If desires and intentions can be conceptualized as being “in an indi-
vidual mind,” obligations and commitments mean for the person to
be in a certain objective social situation. As Jackendoff (1999, 78) put
it, the description “Bill’s belief and desire are in his mind” is a tautol-
ogy, whereas “Bill’s obligation is in his mind” attributes to Bill some
kind of delusion about his social relations. Just like “truth is a reason
for anybody to believe” (Searle 2001b, 137), commitments and obliga-
tions are reasons for anybody to behave. In the same way that beliefs
are commitments to truth and respond to what ought to be believed,
practical commitments respond, I claim, to what ought to be done. At
the exact opposite of desires and intentions, commitments and obliga-
tions thus have the same mind-to-world direction of fit within practi-
cal reasoning as beliefs have within theoretical reasoning: they have
to adjust to the impersonal, objective features that characterize the
external reality. After I made the commitment to go to Chicago,
“going to Chicago” is a future state of the world to which I have to con-
form: I must adjust my behavior and make sure that I act in the way I
ought to act by effectively going to Chicago. The objective commit-
ment to go to Chicago is the antecedent condition that fosters, if not
causes, my subsequent action. From this perspective, desire-inde-
pendent reasons such as obligations and commitments have an
“upward” world-to-mind direction of causation that requires less a
theory of propositional attitudes than an ontology of normative facts.
This causal directionality indeed meets the main criterion that per-
mits us to select the potential candidates for an ontological status: the
causal role peculiar to “basic metaphysical categories” (Laurence &
Macdonald, 1998). Of course, this argument raises the puzzling ques-
tion of the place of those strange “causal” entities in the ontological
furniture of the world. To explore the ontological status of desire-
independent reasons, we have to examine further the specific mode of
existence of normative facts. That is the point of our second episode.
IIb.2. Second Episode: The Strange Objectivity of Desire-Independent
Reasons
To ask what kind of objectivity desire-independent reasons have,
let us first put aside the strange contradiction we find in Searle’s the-
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ory, in which obligations and commitments are at the same time “nei-
ther facts nor intentional states” (Searle 2001b, 103) and “epistemically
objective facts in the world” (Searle 2001b, 119). Let us also forget the
fact that, contrary to Searle’s claim, the subject cannot himself create a
reason for acting independently of his desires when the reason in
question is described as objective. And let us dwell on the only genu-
ine desire-independent episode of Searle’s model, which is about the
status of fact peculiar to obligations and commitments.
While granting a factual status to obligations and commitments,
Searle does not specify the essential property of those facts, that is,
their normativity or their capacity to obligate. Thanks to this remark-
able omission, normativity can be seen as external to the facts in ques-
tion: that is the agent who is in charge of turning or not turning this
mysterious is into an effective ought. Yet, pace Searle, a real ought is not
grafted by agents onto the is of a state of affairs, say the fact to make a
promise. Actually, the promise is not any fact; it is a fact that can be
described either descriptively (e.g., my promise to help him has been
made) or prescriptively (e.g., my promise to help him entails I ought to
help him; von Wright 1995). This double status is constitutive of nor-
mative facts, whose prescriptive power cannot be accounted for by
the interpretative work of individuals or the subjective feeling of
being bound. A normative fact does not become normative because a
particular agent deigns to recognize it as an ought to. Anormative fact,
I think, is by definition intrinsically normative: it logically comprises
both an is and an ought, as revealed in the conditional format “if prom-
ise p, then obligation q.” Instead of being separated by the artificial
gap that Searle assumes in order to leave the decisive intervention to
the self, the antecedent and the consequent are two sides of the same
fact (Petit 1995). In other words, the obligation to pay for a beer is not
the correlate of the agent’s subjective act of recognition; it is the logical
correlate of the very act of ordering a beer.
Given the above, ordering a beer and creating the obligation to pay
are not two different actions, brought together by the intentional
power of the self, but two parts of one single action, governed by the
rule of commercial exchange. Far from following the satisfaction of a
prior desire (to drink the beer) in an ulterior sequence made artifi-
cially autonomous, the desire-independent commitment is part of the
unique whole action “to order a beer in a bar.” Unfortunately, Searle
cannot account for this holistic dimension of action because he
imposes on action the same logical treatment as Zeno used to impose
on space and movement.
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Let us recall that, for Zeno, a fired arrow can never reach its target
because, in order to do that, it needs first to cover the half of the
required distance and the half of the half distance and so forth, indefi-
nitely. The structure of this philosophical puzzle, which shows how
logical reasoning can sometimes contradict the most elementary
commonsense, is found in the way Searle conceives of free will. Actu-
ally, to show the inalienability of free will at each moment of our life,
Searle splits up whole, meaningful actions into short, successive epi-
sodes whose single performance seems to require the full exercise of
free will. For instance, the same course of action “to get a beer in
exchange of money” is split up into artificial sequences that transform
a rule-governed behavior and an institutional obligation into a free
will matter. The application of this new version of the Zeno paradox
to an action such as “to obey the order of his military superior, who
commands his soldiers to march on the enemy’s capital” leads to a
strange statement. If we follow Searle’s reasoning, the soldiers
choose, instead of staying motionless, to take a step forward and
another step forward and so forth, which implies they do march on
the enemy’s capital of their own free will.
Of course, such a conclusion is just as counterintuitive as it is ideo-
logical. In fact, the soldiers’ micro-actions take on their meaning only
within the frame of the whole action “to obey their superior.” It shows
how the determination of what counts as an action or not matters in
deciding whether individuals have will free will and also how free
will can be explained. If one adopts a micro-scale, focused on meaning-
less, derisory actions, such as taking a step forward or moving one’s
finger, one increases the chance to define free will in Searle’s way. But
the price to pay for this result is the same as the logical immobility of
Zeno’s arrow: both conclusions are a mere construction of the philos-
opher’s mind. On the other hand, if one selects a larger scale that indi-
viduates the action, not its fragments, as a significant whole, one sees
those so-called free micro-actions as the steps necessary to perform the
global action that makes sense of them. Now, the reasons for perform-
ing such global actions, whether getting involved in an economical
exchange (such as the beer example) or owing obedience to superiors
(like the military case), are clearly not the making of any self. Those
reasons are duly provided by economic and military institutions.
Yet Searle denies such a conclusion. It is not, he says, the endorse-
ment of institutions that is the essential source of obligations but the
self (Searle 2001b, 198). According to him, institutions provide only
the vehicle for the intentional, voluntary creation of obligations, com-
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mitments, and duties. They are just instrumental tools that enable
individuals to express private thoughts and act in a purposeful way.
“The institution of promising, and other such institutions, make it
possible for rational agents acting freely to publicly bind their will in
the future by acts performed in the present” (Searle 2002, 5). In this
respect, Searle’s intentionalist conception of language is a good give-
away. Like any institution, language is the “syntactic format” allow-
ing to code the self’s intentions of meaning and action, a superficial
covering that is unable to generate semantic contents or impersonal
obligations unless the users freely give their assent to them. “Unless I
think English is somehow a good thing, I am under no obligations
when I speak it” (Searle 2001b, 199). The problem is that such an
instrumentalist perspective not only lapses into the solipsist view of
institutions as facultative options. It also rules out of its framework all
the reasons for acting that are grounded in a community of institu-
tions, rules, and practices. Those reasons, traditionally called “exter-
nal reasons,” provoke an “adequate reaction,” a “correct answer”
from the competent members of a community. For instance, to give an
answer to a question, to obey to one’s superior order, to brake at the
sight of a red light, or to keep one’s promises are different kinds of
adequate reactions to external reasons for acting—in this case, the
question, the order, the red light, and the promise (von Wright 1983).
In those examples, agents do not use the institutions around them to
satisfy their desires; they directly respond to social settings.
Obviously, reactive actions thus triggered or fostered by institu-
tional rules are not free in Searle’s sense. To him, desire-independent
reasons that are not the result of voluntary exchanges but depend on
external conditions must be kept out of the issue of free will. As
Zaibert (2003) put it, Searle’s insistence on voluntariness is not suited
to nonpromissory commitments and obligations whose binding
force, although deriving from an institutional source, does override
the commitments that might arise from the deliberate act of promis-
ing. “For example, I have never promised that I will not intentionally
and unjustifiably injure a fellow human being, yet I am wholeheart-
edly committed to not doing this. This is an enforceable commitment,
both legally and morally” (Zaibert 2003, 73). By modeling any kind of
desire-independent reasons on the self-created obligations emerging
from voluntary speech acts, Searle’s theory is not only unable to
account for enforceable commitments. It also leads to consider the
agent submitted to those impersonal, nonpromissory commitments
as being irrational or alienated. Like the slave who never exercises
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any freedom in creating a reason for himself to act (Searle 2001b, 210),
the agent who does not intend to place himself under an obligation
but is passively subjected to it is neither free nor rational. Such reason-
ing thus results in assuming, as Castoriadis (1988) put it, that 95% of
human actions are not rational but traditional. The range of actions in
which genuine free will is exercised—and hence Searle’s inquiry—is
indeed dramatically reduced to a derisory 5% of human actions,
namely, subjectively intended micro-actions (i.e., moving one’s fin-
ger, scratching one’s head, or going swimming rather than biking). To
avoid this disastrous consequence, it is necessary to admit that desire-
independent reasons, although generated by institutions, are able to
induce rational actions. In fact, institutional reasons, though follow-
ing the mind-to-world direction of causation that we spoke of above,
exert only a conditional causation over individuals.7 Agents keep at
least the virtual possibility of evaluating the meaning of their actions
and envisaging alternative options, possibility which is a central
criterion for rationality (Winch 1958).
Given the existence of objective, institutional reasons, it remains to
be seen how normative facts can act upon individual minds. After all,
to the extent that normative facts are both desire independent and not
strictly causal, they require from the agent the capacity to make their
normativity effectual. Now, in Searle’s instrumentalist model of insti-
tutions, it is very difficult to understand why the self would freely
force itself into some course of action by recognizing the alleged neu-
tral is of desire-independent reasons as an effective ought. In my sense,
the answer lies in an internal version of institutions, focused on the
“background” of actions and on the “causal sensitivity to institu-
tions” that Searle himself, who denies its relevance to the issue of
rationality and free will, speaks of elsewhere (Searle 1995, 142).
IIb.3. Third Episode: The Binding Recognition
of Desire-Independent Reasons
Within Searle’s framework, the transformation of what can and
may be a reason for action into an internal, effective motivation for act-
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7. Conditional causation, as Peirce put it, is not about the positive universe of empir-
ical occurrences: it is about properties, status, and types of actions, which virtually
determine the range of future behaviors, not the behaviors themselves (Hulswit 2002).
The impersonal entitlements and obligations constitutive of a given status, for instance,
husband, rule a whole range of behaviors without causing the effective behaviors of
real people, who can always deny or disclaim those entitlements and obligations.
ing is quite mysterious. After all, “why should the commitments that I
voluntarily and intentionally undertake be binding on me?” (Zaibert
2003). Searle’s unique solution to this issue is the vague notion of
“recognitional rationality,” that is, a process that is supposed to trans-
late desire-independent reasons into internal motivators. But what
about the dynamics of this recognition? To me, the only way to solve
this puzzle is to resort to the preintentional “background,” composed
of practical abilities, extralinguistic expectations, and tacit knowl-
edge that shape intentional states (Searle 1983, 1995, 1998). But unfor-
tunately for the coherence of Searle’s whole theory, the background
miraculously vanishes from his argumentation as soon as the issues
of free will and practical deliberation are concerned. While admitting
the background can strongly limit the range of possibilities getting to
the level of consciousness, Searle (2001b, 25) claims that this limita-
tion is not a logical or theoretical issue but only a practical issue. Yet, in
my view, the omnipresence of the background contradicts both prac-
tically and logically Searle’s strange assumption according to which
“we are presented with an indefinite, indeed strictly speaking
infinite, range of choices” (Searle 2001b, 233).
In fact, I think that the role of the background is anything but a con-
tingent, practical issue. Searle, who has emphasized in the past the
logical importance of the background, should have seen this point.
Actually, in his first works, the existence of the background is postu-
lated to solve the logical problem of the infinite regress of representa-
tional stages, in which the indeterminate interpretation of one stage
must be completed by a further indeterminate interpretation ad infi-
nitum. Given that the management of an infinite series of successive
interpretations is pragmatically, evolutionary, and cognitively impos-
sible, organisms must logically have at their disposal implicit
resources that complete automatically the informational inputs
(Searle 1983). For Searle, this set of resources, called the background,
restrains the range of possible interpretations, imposes categoriza-
tions on conscious experiences, and shapes new events into
understandable phenomena.
The conclusion that everyone—except, curiously, Searle himself—
can draw from the preintentional implementation of the background
is easy enough: the relationship, if any, that the person can possibly
maintain with her own intentional states and hence with her reasons
for acting is partially “opaque.” Explicit motivations and conscious
reasons for acting thus have no practical and logical means to escape
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from the rigid conative and cognitive paths structuring conscious
mental states in a non- or preintentional way. Moreover, contrary to
what Searle (2001b) claims, the logical contribution of the background
to the scope of choices and sense of possibilities does make the recog-
nition of desire-independent reasons less enigmatic. This recognition
is fostered, I think, by the inclination to acknowledge some facts as
worthy of being acted upon. Practical reasoning about the hierarchy
of ends, far from starting from scratch, is grounded on a previous set
of preferences and dispositions that impose its own scale of priorities
on any ulterior decision making. While remaining partially inde-
pendent of desires, desire-independent reasons take a moral form
that makes them, if not desirable, at least intrinsically valuable. As
Durkheim put it, moral desirability and obligation are two comple-
mentary sides of institutional facts: “obligation or duty express only
one of the aspects, and an abstract aspect, of morality. A certain
desirability is another feature, no less essential, than the first one”
(Durkheim 1924/1996, 50).
Of course, the background contribution to the desirability of cer-
tain ends and reasons for action is not idiosyncratic. In my sense, the
preintentional set of preferences results in one way or another from
the public hierarchization of ends and activities that constitutes,
broadly speaking, politics. Actually, politics, defined after Aristotle as
an “order of subordination” whose nature is “architectonic,” estab-
lishes the obligations of individuals toward the city and submits indi-
vidual activities to public reason (Descombes 1994, 153). Although it
would be abusive to turn desire-independent reasons for acting into
“reasons of State,” such a public, impersonal hierarchy of ends does
certainly resonate with the alleged private hierarchy of preferences.
As Korsgaard (1996) points out, agents are the “citizens” of “a King-
dom of Ends,” a kingdom that is not only moral but also political. The
preintentional capacities of the background allow agents to recognize
rules and obligations as being good reasons for acting, that is, valu-
able and justifiable. In other words, desire-independent reasons
appear as appropriate candidates for the title of internal motivators
because the background is previously sensitive to their appropriate-
ness. This background sensitivity results from the long-term adapta-
tion of individuals to their sociocultural environment, including insti-
tutions and the hierarchy of ends these very institutions establish.
Institutions, thanks to the prereflexive counterpart of their constitu-
tive norms and obligations, do not need to resort to violence to ensure
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their binding force. The prepolitical workings of the background are
effective enough to determine desirable reasons for acting, to
motivate people to do or not to do certain things, and to make a
personal virtue out of institutional necessity.
III. FOR AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF AGENCY
By placing Searle’s arguments one step after another in proper
order, we have seen that his conception is too individualistic to really
account for the impersonal, public status of reasons. Reasons for act-
ing, which stem from objective relations of structural dependence
and/or common agreement, cannot be dependent on the idiosyn-
cratic goodwill of specific individuals. In a way, Searle’s previous
thinking backfires on his recent model of free will, devoted to the res-
cue of the sovereign self. For from my point of view, the canonical
form “count-as,” which reflects, for Searle (1995), the logical skeleton
of institutional facts, applies perfectly well to reasons for acting: to
recognize a reason for acting amounts to counting it as a reason. What
counts as a reason for acting, far from depending on the self’s creativ-
ity, is determined by collective practices, institutions, and norms. Rea-
sons for acting thus are not private, mental entities but public, share-
able, and generalizable grounds that all can share as participants in a
community of practice and language. As a result, the difference of
kind that Searle postulates between desire-independent and desire-
dependent reasons turns out to be rather a difference of degree. Rea-
sons for acting, in virtue of their public, impersonal dimension, do not
have a subjective ontology but what I call a first-person plural ontol-
ogy (Kaufmann 1999b): like other normative facts, they are irreduc-
ible to the mental contents furnishing the narrow, opaque context of a
particular mind. Reasons for acting, normative facts, and institutions
that frame, supply, and shape individual wills make sense only
within the broad context of the We of a given community. Even if rea-
sons for acting have been created by human minds, they enjoy high-
level properties that cannot be restricted to the mental realm of any
solipsist self. In this respect, the analogy between the relationship
brain/mind and individual/society that Durkheim (1924/1996)
drew many years ago still stands. Just like the high-level mental prop-
erties of the mind emerge and are liberated from the low-level config-
uration of the neurons in the brain, norms and institutions have col-
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lective properties that emerge from the interactions between minds
and are irreducible to mental properties (Durkheim 1924/1996, 34).
The study of psychological processes is indeed as unable to make
sense of the action “to order a beer” as the study of the chemical
components of money is pointless for the understanding of
economical cycles.
If, as I suggest it, only a first-person plural or We-ontology is able to
allow for reasons for acting, common meanings, and public practices,
phenomena that do respond to a subjective ontology become
restricted to one unique domain: the phenomenal domain of sensa-
tions and qualia, that is, the idiosyncratic properties characterizing
what it is like to drink a beer or to feel compelled to pay for it. But the
qualia are far from doing justice to the intentional ability to “get out-
side the circle of our own ideas” and to be aware of something that is
not ourselves (Chisholm 1972, 202). The subjective viewpoint of a
transcendental self contemplating its inner realm cannot account for
the feature of aboutness proper to intentionality. Intentional phenom-
ena indeed comprise by definition distal, external properties, such as
the externality of referents, the indexicality of contexts, and the
adjustment of interactions. In the absence of those exogenous, share-
able, and public properties, individual minds would turn into irratio-
nal, ill-adapted selves, unable to make a difference between their own
hallucinations and the external reality. To avoid this solipsist tragedy,
I will plead for an alternative model of agency after I have reviewed
Searle’s arguments in favor of the self.
If we follow Searle (2001b, 59), agents have the phenomenological
experience that psychological antecedents of their action are not suffi-
cient to determine their action and that alternative future decisions
and actions are open to them. Although he admits such an experien-
tial gap could be an illusion, it is an illusion so necessary that we have
to presuppose that “the phenomenology corresponds to a reality”
(Searle 2001b, 71). In fact, the use of this phenomenological argument
is quite surprising for someone who is used to energetically denying
the relevance of phenomenology, which is focused on the superficial
seeming of the world instead of its real structure (Searle 2001a). But
above all, it is well known that the phenomenal account of what it is
like to act cannot be turned into the ontological account of what an
action really is. As the grammatical approaches, inspired by
Wittgenstein, regularly recall it, the conception of the self as a privi-
leged epistemic entity might be nothing more than a superficial fea-
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ture of the language game of action (Bouveresse 1976/1987; Ryle
1949/1984; Shanker 1991).8
Potentially aware of this difficulty, Searle uses a kind of argumen-
tative hopscotch to skip it. As soon as the kind of argument he is
using, in this case phenomenological, becomes dubious, he jumps to
another “argumentative square” and turns to a logical argument for
help. But this theoretical jump does not prove to be very helpful.
Actually, we have seen in the first part of our article that an ontologi-
cal claim, that is, the self as a substantial entity initiating and carrying
out actions, cannot be derived from the self as a formal, logical
requirement on rational action. Yet Searle’s reasoning goes as follows:
from the phenomenological distinction between the events happening
to me and the actions I make happen, and from the logical assumption
that each active voluntary process must have a self who thinks, he
draws the conclusion that such a self really does exist. Thanks to this
double fallacy, he succeeds in making both the phenomenological
feeling of agency and the logical presupposition of actions, that is,
responsibility and freedom, dependent on the existence of a
conscious, substantial self.
For the people wishing to defend, as I do, a more convincing model
of action, what is at stake is to show that neither the phenomenological
aspect of agency, namely, the feeling of deciding and acting, nor the
presumption of responsibility and freedom require a substantial self.
And in fact, there is a theory of action that permits the elimination of
any ontological link between agency and a privileged self. This the-
ory, mostly explored by Wittgensteinian philosophers, advocates a
teleological rather than a mentalist account of action. Whereas the
mentalist model of action holds that a given state of mind determines
why one should do X, the teleological model assumes that states of
mind are determined by the facts and processes that are suited to
achieving one’s purpose—say, buying flowers is suited to cheering
up someone (Butterfill 2001). Unlike the mentalistic model, the teleo-
logical approach avoids artificially breaking down behaviors into two
separate and independent actions, one mental and the other one
physical. In this view, the intended action is not the physical conse-
quence of a mental plan but the antecedent of a practical reasoning
establishing what should be done to perform the action in question
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8. In the same way that a sentence such as “the actual king of France is bald” leads us
to assume the existence of a king of France, the I-sentences would lead us to assume the
existence of an extralinguistic reference, in this case, the self, to the I in position of
subject.
(Descombes 1996). Now, the different steps necessary to achieve one’s
end are too indeterminate to be fixed a priori in the individual’s mind:
they indeed require successive adjustments to other people’s contri-
butions, environmental resources, and contextual constraints. For
instance, the agent who intends to converse with his friend or to order
a beer in a bar has to deal with the bad mood of his interlocutor or the
stress of the waiter to achieve his goal. According to this teleological
conception of action, practical rationality is not, as Searle (2001b, 30-
31) suggests it, the choice, determined by the self prior to acting,
between conflicting or incompatible ends. Practical reasoning obeys,
so to speak, a reality principle: it is synonymous with a “trying to get,”
which implies by definition the functional adaptation to real circum-
stances (Anscombe 1957; Ricoeur 1977). Agentive power thus lies in
the practical capacities for anticipating and evaluating the fallouts of
one’s action, taking advantage of contingent resources, and determin-
ing the most appropriate way to act.
In this framework, the distinction between purposive actions and
passive events is no more dependent on the existence of a self “cook-
ing up in its internal kitchen” a decision and using only “the ingredi-
ents that it has allowed through the door” (Dennett 2003, 123). Such a
distinction emerges from the sense of purposiveness that goes with
the practical pursuing of a particular course of action. Phenomen-
ologically, indeed, the feeling of deciding and acting, instead of
emerging from an abstract activity of deliberation, loaded with the
mysterious “metaphysical weight” of the self, is the counterpart of the
act of doing. In the same way, the experience of freedom or non-
freedom arises when the agent comes up against external constraints,
either other people’s wills or institutional forces. Logically also, the
teleological perspective avoids creating an ontological illusion, such
as Searle’s self. Actually, the issues of responsibility and freedom can-
not be addressed in the absolute and concerned with a brain isolated
in a vat. This is only the performance of a given action in real-life situ-
ations that makes those issues relevant, mainly by inevitably raising
the questions “of whom this action is” or “to whom is happening”
(Descombes 1991).
This claim makes it possible for me to stress an important point. In
Searle’s account, the issue of free will is framed only on the potential
incompatibility between the causal determinism of the physical
world and the alleged indeterminacy of ontologically subjective phe-
nomena. Although this framing still prevails in philosophy of mind, it
fails to account for the fact that the presumptions of responsibility and
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freedom are not formed in a social vacuum. Those presumptions
indeed stem from the mutual expectations of accountability and
justifiability that actors impose on one another (Baynes 2001). Via the
social practice of demanding and giving reasons, individuals are
given responsibility over time, so that they can reliably be there to
take responsibility and answer when questions of accountability arise
(Dennett 2003). The order of explanation here is thus the opposite of
Searle’s: a person is responsible because people, authorities, and insti-
tutions take her to be responsible, which means that a person’s being
responsible is a function of a stance others take toward her. In other
words, the first-person stance adopted by people who claim responsi-
bility for their actions derives from the third-person stance taken by
others toward them (Strawson 1959/1990; Kaufmann 1999a). Little
by little, individuals appropriate the status of responsible subject
ascribed to them by others and adopt the social norms of reasonable-
ness and accountability with regard to themselves. As competent
members of their community, they transform the heteroascriptions
they are subjected to into “self-ascriptions” (Harré 1983).
The emphasis on freedom and responsibility as creations of an
interpersonal design process shifts the issue of free will away from the
pursuit of a self whose God-like power would enable it to exempt
itself from the causal fabric of the physical world. Once free will has
been reframed in terms of “civil” freedom and mutual responsibility,
the main problem at stake becomes “first-person authority”: this con-
cept, often mentioned in philosophy of action, refers to the fact that
individuals, although endorsing hetero-ascriptions and public rea-
sons for acting, enjoy nevertheless an authority about their own
thoughts and sensations that is denied to others (Anscombe 1975;
Davidson 1984). Even if the description and explanation of a given
action necessarily take place in the public space of reasons, the final
answer to the question why the agent performed such or such action
belongs to him (Ricoeur 1977; Kaufmann 1999a). This being so, first-
person authority, while respecting the fundamental asymmetry
between first- and third-person perspectives, makes sense only in
relation to other kinds of authority, whether second-person authority
(other people) or collective, impersonal authority (norms, institu-
tions). Unlike selfhood, which obeys a logic of introspection, first-per-
son authority obeys a logic of mutual attribution that emerges from
the social practice of holding people as responsible reason givers.
The concept of first-person authority also makes it possible to
show that claiming, like Searle (2001b, 178), that “the fact that people
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are bound as husbands, wives, citizens, taxpayers . . . say nothing
about the first-person point of view” is false. Actually, the attributions
and expectations constitutive of institutional roles we are committed
to are sooner or later translated into a conception of ourselves as hus-
band, friend, or citizen. Such self-conceptions have obvious effects on
the first-person point of view: to endorse the status of husband,
friend, or citizen is tantamount to adopting fundamental standards of
evaluation and principles of choice as for which actions and reasons
for acting are suitable. But contrary to the asocial self, first-person
authority is not jeopardized by the ongoing process of appropriating
role ascriptions and “reflexively self-referring” that Martin and
Sugarman (1999) speak of. First-person authority is a perpetual social
achievement that precisely fits people capable of responding to the
range of statutory entitlements and obligations, whether official or
not.
CONCLUSION
After examining Searle’s ontological approach, it seems to me that
his reasoning creates, instead of discovers, dualistic gaps. Actually,
we have seen first that the causal relations that are supposed to bridge
the gap between first-person and third-person phenomena fail to save
the alleged monist ontology advocated by Searle’s biological natural-
ism. One way to break this deadlock might be to stop seeking the
ontological noncorrespondence between brain and mind. Given the
obvious fact that mental states are nothing but physical, Searle’s crite-
rion for free will, namely, its independence from the brain processes
that embody it, sounds wrongly dualistic. In this respect, the focus on
the sensory, functional mappings that define the brain/mind as a
dynamic whole, able to direct living organisms in their environment,
seems more promising (Proust 1997; Damasio 1999). Within this func-
tionalist framework, the issue of free will—that is, how can free will
survive the causal, blind forces of physical facts—yields to the issue of
conscious will: does the fact that certain states are conscious give
them a causal, decisive power over unconscious states? In other
words, does the conscious access to certain mental states exert a kind
of feedback causation on the mostly unconscious action processing?
According to Libet (1999), this kind of feedback does exist. Even if, as
he has shown in previous works, the initiation of a voluntary act
begins in the brain well before the person consciously knows she
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wants to act, the conscious function has enough time to affect the final
outcome of the volitional process. In Libet’s account, conscious will,
although it does not initiate a voluntary act, can thus veto the process
and control whether the act takes place. From my point of view, such a
“veto-consciousness” has the great advantage of accounting for
agency without requiring a sovereign self ruling a free market of
transparent reasons.
In the second part of our article, we have seen that Searle’s ontol-
ogy of reasons for acting feeds on the solipsist gap created between
the inner, subjective realm and the outer, social world. The problem is
that the surprising indifference of individuals to other people and
institutions is not only questionable for the philosophers who have
what Searle (2001b, 182) calls an “unhealthy obsession with some-
thing called ethics and morality.” It is problematic for any theory of
action for it makes the self both irresponsible and asocial. Actually,
Searle’s solipsist self can place its private intentions in opposition to
other people’s interpretation and disclaim the public consequences of
its own actions. Whereas the slave that Searle speaks of is not account-
able for his actions because he is forced to act, the self cannot be held
accountable for its actions whenever it does not want to. Counter to this
view, I have argued that social, real agents cannot escape from respon-
sibility and accountability. The command of the course of any mean-
ingful action does require the identification of good reasons for acting
and the anticipation of the potential justifiability of one’s behaviors.
Far from the exclusive property of a solipsist self, the capacity to
determine the sense, reasonableness, and desirability of one’s action
comes within the competence that any member of the community
must master: the competence to endorse the We-stance or, as Mead
(1962/1970) put it, the impersonal viewpoint of the “generalized
other.” Instead of making the I-stance disappear, the We-stance is its
logical condition of possibility. First-person authority indeed
emerges little by little from the objective reality of norms, obligations,
and roles that enable individuals to shape their identity through
mediated self-references. Reconceptualized under the aegis of first-
person authority, agency, freedom, and responsibility do not require
the maintenance of a field of gaps. They appear as fundamentally
social phenomena whose ontology is neither the third-person ontol-
ogy of the matter nor the first-person ontology of phenomenal con-
sciousness. Rather, it is the first-person plural ontology specific to the
impersonal properties of normative and institutional facts, including
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reasons for acting, that make sense of agency, freedom, and
responsibility.
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